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Summary  findings
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer compare egalitarian  To illustrate the arguments and methods, tbe authors
concepts of fairness in health care payments (requiring  use data on out-of-pocket  health spending in 'Vietnam in
that payments be linked to ability to pay) and minimum  1993 and  1998-an  interesting application,  rince  80
standards approaches (requiring that payments not  percent of health spending in that country w;S out-of-
exceed a prespecified share of prepayment income or not  pocket in 1998. They find that out-of-pocket  payments
drive households into poverty). They develop indices for  had a smaller disequalizing effect on income  listribution
both sets of approaches.  in 1998 than  1993, whether income is measured as
The authors compare the "agnostic" approach, which  prepayment income or as ability to pay (that is,
does not prespecify exactly how payments should be  prepayment income less deductions, regardless of how
linked to ability to pay, with a recently proposed  deductions are defined). The underlying caus- of the
approach that requires payments to be proportional  to  smaller disequalizing effect of out-of-pocket payments
ability to pay. They link the two approaches using results  differs depending on whether the benchmark distribution
from the income redistribution literature on taxes and  is prepayment income or ability to pay.
deductions, arguing that ability to pay can be thought of  The authors find that the incidence and int,t  :sity  of
as prepayment income less deductions deemed necessary  catastrophic payments-in  terms of both prep ayment
to ensure that a household reaches a minimum standard  income and ability to pay-declined  between 1993 and
of living or food consumption.  1998, and that both the incidence and the int.ensity  of
The authors show how both approaches can be  catastrophe became less concentrated among -he poor.
enriched by distinguishing between vertical equity (or  They also find that the incidence and intensit) of the
redistribution) and horizontal equity, and show how  poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments dirinished
these can be quantified. They develop indices for  over the period. Finally, they find that the pov  erty
"catastrophe"  that capture the intensity of catastrophe as  impact of out-of-pocket payments is due primarily to
well as its incidence and also allow the analyst to capture  poor people becoming even poorer  rather tha i the
the degree to which catastrophic payments occur  nonpoor  becoming poor and that in Vietnam  r0  1998 it
disproportionately  among poor households. Their  was not expenses associated with inpatient carc that
measures of the poverty impact of health care payments  increased poverty but nonhospital expenditures.
also capture both intensity and incidence.
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Much has been written recently about equity or fairness in health financing, the financial
protection function of health systems, "catastrophic" health care costs, and the
impoverishment associated with health care outlays. The World Health Organization
(WHO), for example, in its 2000 World Health Report (WHR) Health Systems:
Improving Performance (World Health Organization 2000) proposed and estimated
values of a fairness of financing contribution (FFC) index, and argued that providing
financial protection to households is an important goal of any health system. The
International Labour Organization (ILO), in a forthcoming report Toward Decent Work:
Social Protection in Health  for all Workers  and their Families (Baeza et al. 2001)
discusses the importance of considering "catastrophic" health care costs and of modifying
insurance systems to provide protection against them. Reflecting the importance of the
theme in its Voices of the Poor consultative exercise (Narayan et al. 2000), the World
Bank in its 2000/2001 World Development Report (WDR) Attacking Poverty (World
Bank 2000) emphasized the impoverishing effects of ill health in general and of the costs
of health care in particular. Furthermore, the 1997 strategy paper for its health sector
(World Bank 1997) committed the Bank to "working with countries to reducing the
impoverishing effects of ill health...."
Two distinct strands of thinking are evident in this debate. One is based on
egalitarian notions of equity or fairness. A common theme here is that payments for
health care ought to be linked not to usage of health services but rather to ability to pay,
and the concern is with the degree of inequality in one or other variable. The other
focuses on minimum standards. Here there is some divergence of view, but in each case
the concern is not with inequality in any variable but rather with a variable exceeding or
falling short of a threshold. One approach sets the threshold in terms of proportionality of
income. The concern is to ensure that households do not spend more than some pre-
specified fraction of their income on health care (call it z). Spending in excess of z is
labeled "catastrophic". The idea is, in effect, to ensure that households have at least (I -z)
of their income to spend on things other than health care. The other approach sets the
minimum in terms of the absolute level of income. The concern here is to ensure that
spending on health care does not push households into poverty-or  further into it if they
already there. These two approaches are fundamentally different-neither  is "right", and
the choice between them must be made on normative and ideological grounds.
IOur purpose in this paper is not to advocate a particular position, but rather to
shed some new light on the measurement issues involved and to explore the inter-
relationships between the various measures and the approaches. We present measures of
fairness, catastrophe in health spending and impoverishment, relate them to the previous
literature, and compare them with one another. We illustrate the various measures
empirically using data on out-of-pocket payments for health care in Vietnam. This is not
an uninteresting case study. In 1998, around 80% of health spending in Vietnam was paid
out-of-pocket. Unsurprisingly, in the World Bank's recent Voices of the Poor
consultative exercise (Narayan et al. 2000), payments for health care came across as a
major concern of poor people in Vietnam. Three key changes occurred in Vietnam during
the 1990s which make the study of Vietnam and the period chosen additionally
interesting (World Bank et al. 2001). First, user fees in the public sector rose. The
increase was especially pronounced for hospital care, where fees appear to have risen by
over 1000% in real terms between 1993 and 1998, but were also noticeable in commune
health centers even though these were still supposed to be free in 1998. Second, there was
a large rise in fees for private clinics and doctors. These apparently rose by nearly 600%
over the period 1993-98. Third, expenditures on drugs actuallyfell over the period 1993-
98, due to a 30% fall in the real price of medicines during the period in question. The
latter seems to have been due in part to deregulation of the pharmaceutical sector and in
part to increased donor assistance in drug supplies. Fourth, social health insurance was
introduced in 1993 (World Bank et al. 2001). Initially, this was on a compulsory basis for
formal sector workers and civil servants. However, more recently the scheme has been
opened up to others on a voluntary basis-including  the family members of insureds. By
1998, 12% of the Vietnamese population was covered by social insurance, a little over
half of these being covered on a voluntary basis. Compulsory social insurance covers
some of the costs of both inpatient and outpatient care, and also pays for drugs used in
inpatient treatment. The voluntary scheme has two levels of coverage, the less generous
(and less expensive) of which covers only inpatient care, while the higher-priced more
generous package includes outpatient care and some drug costs. Most voluntary enrollees
have opted for the less costly package. Insurance coverage is most common among the
higher income groups.
It is important to be clear what we are not doing in this paper. Any assessment ol
the fairness of a health care system requires looking not just at what people pay for health
services but also at how much they use services (van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, and Rutten
1993). Health care payments and health service utilization are, in other words, both key
"focal" variables whose distributions have to be examined in any assessment of the
fairness of a health care system. For each focal variable there is a distribution that is
2considered to be fair (the "target distribution"). The actual distribution of each focal
variable reflects the characteristics of both the health care financing system and the
health care delivery system. For example, the split between pre-payment and out-of-
pocket payments influences not only the distribution of the prices people pay at the point
of use for their health services (and hence the distribution of payments), but also their use
of health services (and hence the distribution of utilization). Likewise, most
characteristics of the health care delivery system (e.g. whether there is a GP who plays a
gatekeeper function) influence not only the amount of health services people use (and
hence the distribution of utilization) but also which type of services they use and hence
how much they pay for them (and hence the distribution of payments). An assessment of
whether a distribution of payments is fair is not therefore an assessment of whether the
financing system is fair, any more than an assessment of whether a distribution of
utilization is fair is an assessment of whether the delivery system is fair. Rather these
exercises ought to be seen simply as assessments of "equity in health care payments" and
"equity in health care utilization" respectively. In this paper, our focus is exclusively on
the former. It therefore sheds light on only one of the two issues that need exploring in
any analysis of equity in health care financing. Elsewhere we have suggested (Wagstaff,
Van Doorslaer, and Paci 1991; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2000) and employed (Van
Doorslaer et al. 1992; Van Doorslaer et al. 2000) methods for assessing equity in the
utilization of health care.
It is also worth being explicit about the rationales that underpin concerns over the
two focal variables-health  care utilization and payments for health care-since  these are
often not considered self-evident. Concern over the first can be thought of as deriving in
part from the fact that health is considered a precondition for people to survive and
flourish as human beings, in part from the fact that health is subject to potentially large
"shocks" which are unforeseen and are rarely the result of a deliberate choice by the
individual concerned, and in part from the presumption that health care is the appropriate
way to restore health status following such a "shock" (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). The
rationale for the concern over the second focal variable also appears to derive in part
from the fact that health care utilization is a response to an unforeseen and unsolicited
"shock", but also in part from the fact that health care utilization can be sufficiently
costly to represent a threat to a household's ability to purchase other goods and services
that may, like health care, make a difference to its members' ability to survive flourish as
a human beings (Culyer 1993). The most obvious example of these other goods and
services is food. But clothing, shelter and energy are other important examples. Thus
irrespective of whether a particular treatment enables a person to regain his or her former
3health status following a health "shock", if the expenditure associated with it
compromises the household's ability to feed itself, this in itself is a matter for concern.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in sections 2-4 with the egalitarian
approach. The common theme here is that payments for health care ought to be linked not
to usage of services but rather to ability to pay (ATP). The first strand of this literature we
explore-in  section 2-acknowledges  the ATP principle and the motivation for it, bul
takes the view that since policy-makers rarely if ever specify either how ATP is to be
defined or how payments should be linked to ATP, the best way forward is simply to
measure the degree of progressivity of existing payments on gross income (Wagstaff elt
al. 1992; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, van der Berg et al. 1999) or the degree of income
redistribution resulting from this progressivity (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1997; Van
Doorslaer et al. 1999). Since no target distribution is specified for payments, this
approach does not generate any information on the degree of inequity in the distribution
of payments for health care. We call this approach the "agnostic" approach. The secon(d
strand of literature, which is more recent and which we explore in section 3, is more
ambitious and tries to quantify inequity (World Health Organization 2000). It both
defines ATP and stipulates what the relationship between payments and ATP should be.
In sections 2 and 3, we employ the methods developed in the literature on the
progressivity and redistributive effect of taxes (Lambert 1993; Pfahler 1990; Wagstaff
and van Doorslaer 2001). These have been widely employed in the literature we cover in
section 2 and have the advantages of being informative and having properties that are
well understood. As one of us has argued elsewhere (Wagstaff 2000), these methods have
advantages over the index proposed by WHO in its WHR and used to date in the second
strand of the egalitarian literature. One of the aims of the present paper is, in fact, to
ground the ATP approach in a sounder measurement methodology. Having done this in
section 3, the paper then moves to section 4 where it is argued that although the methocds
employed in sections 2 and 3 are attractive, they have the disadvantage of focussing oll
vertical differences. They ignore the fact that much of the inequity in payments for health
care arise from horizontal inequity, not least because people on a given income can spend
quite different amounts depending on whether they are struck by illness. In section 4, wwe
show how the measurement in both sections 2 and 3 can be improved by use of an
approach that allows vertical and horizontal inequities to be quantified (Aronson,
Johnson, and Lambert 1994; Aronson and Lambert 1994; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer
1997; Van Doorslaer et al. 1999).
Sections 5 and 6 then address the minimum standards approaches. In section 5 fve
explore the idea that health care payments above a threshold can be considered
"catastrophic" and we propose and implement a variety of measures that capture the
4incidence and intensity of catastrophe in health spending. We also present measures that
capture the degree to which catastrophic health spending is concentrated among the poor.
Section 6 addresses the issue of impoverishment-the  extent to which people are made
poor-or  more poor-by  health spending. We present measures that capture the
impoverishing effects of health spending, distinguishing between the incidence and
intensity of impoverishment, and showing how one can assess the extent to which greater
intensity is due to people being made even poorer by health spending or by people
becoming poor through such spending. In our coverage of both catastrophic health
spending and impoverishment, we illustrate the measures with data on out-of-pocket
payments from Vietnam for both 1993 and 1998. In the case of impoverishment, we show
the differential impacts of hospital costs and other health care spending. Section 7
contains a summary and offers some conclusions.
2.  Progressivity and income redistribution
One approach, then, is simply to measure the degree of progressivity of the
payments distribution and the income redistribution associated with it. Some theoretical
results from the tax literature help clarify the relationship between these concepts, as well
as the link between them and ability to pay.
2.1.  Progressivity and redistributive effect: Some theoretical results
2.1.1.  Progressivity
Let pre-payment income (the analogue of pre-tax income in the tax literature) be
x, and health care payments be T (the analogue of taxes). There are two useful results
from the tax literature. The first concerns progressivity. We can measure the progressivity
using Kakwani's (1977) index. Denote Kakwani's index of progressivity of health care
payments on pre-payment income by  z',  which is defined as twice the area between the
Lorenz curve for pre-payment income, Lx(p), and the concentration curve for health care
payments, Lc(p). (Thep  in parentheses here indicates the person's or household's rank in
the pre-payment income distribution.) The concentration curve for payments is formed by
plotting the cumulative share of payments on the vertical axis against the cumulative
proportion of households (or individuals) ranked by pre-payment income on the
horizontal axis (Figure 1). Thus we have:
(1)  ,rTK  =2  [L_(p)-LT(P)Pp=CT-  GX,
Swhere Gx is the Gini coefficient for pre-payment income and CT is the concentration
index for health care payments. iTK is positive if the concentration curve for payments
lies below the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income, indicating that payments are
progressive on pre-payment income. A zero value of 7TT  indicates proportionality, w?iile
a negative value indicates regressiveness.
2.1.2.  Redistributive effect and the link with progressivity
Progressivity of payments on pre-payment income implies that payments exert an
equalizing effect on the income distribution. The income distribution will, in other words,
be more equal "after" payments than "before". This can be seen from the second relevant
result from the tax literature, which concerns redistributive effect. We can measure the
redistributive effect as the reduction or increase in income inequality associated with the
move from the pre-payment to post-payment income distributions. If we ignore any re-
ranking of households in this process (an issue to which we return in section 4 below), we
can measure redistributive effect using the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index (Reynolds
and Smolensky 1977). Denote the RS index of redistributive effect of health care
payments by  7TTRS,  which is defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve for pre-
payment income, Lx(p), and the concentration curve for post-payment income, LX (P)
(Figure 1). Thus we have:
(2)  Rs S2  fLX-T  (P)-Lx  (P)PP = GX -CX-T,
where CX-T is the concentration index for post-payment income. ifT  is positive if the
concentration curve for post-payment income lies above the Lorenz curve for pre-
payment income, indicating that payments reduce income inequality. A zero value of
RCs indicates zero redistributive effect, while a negative value indicates pro-rich income
redistribution. The  T  RS  index is linked to the Kakwani index )TT  by the following
relationship:
(3)  XT=RS  )  KT
where t is the payment share-i.e.,  the share that payments make up, on average, of pre-
payment income. Thus redistributive effect is an increasing function of progressivity, so
that payments that are progressive on pre-payment income make for a distribution of
post-payment income that is more equal than the distribution of pre-payment income.
This redistributive effect is larger the more progressive payments are on pre-payment
income, and the larger is the payment share, t.
6The measurement of progressivity and redistributive effect thus responds to the
concern identified above with the distribution of health care payments, namely that
redistributive effect tells us how much more unequal (or equal) health care payments
make the distribution of income. This is clearly of interest if our concern is with the level
and distribution of income households have available for purchasing food and other
"'necessities" after they have paid for their health care. But it does not tell us whether
payments are equitably distributed. The second-sub-strand of literature covered in section
3 tries to do this.
2.2.  Progressivity and redistributive effect of out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam
Before turning to this strand of literature, we present results on the progressivity
and redistributive effect of out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam in the years 1993 and
1998. The data we use are taken from the 1992-93 and 1997-98 Vietnam Living
Standards Surveys (VLSS) undertaken jointly by the government of Vietnam and the
World Bank. For the purpose of this exercise, the household is taken as the sharing unit
for income and payments (both being assumed to be shared equally across household
members), but the individual is taken as the unit of analysis. In the case of the 1997-98
survey (which is not nationally representative) the sample is weighted using sampling
weights. Household pre-payment income is measured by total household consumption,
gross of out-of-pocket payments for health services. Household post-payment income is
simply pre-payment income so defined net of out-of-pocket payments. Pre-payment and
post-payment income are both defined to be gross of food consumption. Both pre-
payment and post-payment income are defined on a per capita basis. Out-of-pocket
payments are derived in both years from two questions on health spending over the last
12 months, one specifically on inpatient care, the other on all other goods and services
associated with the treatment and diagnosis of illness and injury.
Table I shows, for each of the two years, the values of x (pre-payment income), T
(out-of-pocket payments), t (the income share of out-of-pocket payments), Gx (the Gini
coefficient for pre-payment income), CT  (the concentration index for out-of-pocket
payments), 7rK (the Kakwani index of progressivity of out-of-pocket payments on pre-
payment income), CX-T  (the concentration index for post-payment income vis-a-vis pre-
payment income), and  ArTS  (the Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistributive effect for
out-of-pocket payments vis-a-vis pre-payment income). It shows that the income share t
of out-of-pocket payments fell because income rose faster than out-of-pocket payments.
Out-of-pocket payments were regressive on pre-payment income in 1993, but were close
to proportional in 1998. Inequality in pre-payment income fell very slightly between
1993 and 1998, but inequality in out-of-pocket payments rose. The degree of
7redistributive effect was negative (i.e., pro-rich) in both years but was much smaller in
1998 than 1993, in part because of the reduction in regressivity but in part because of the
reduced share of out-of-pocket payments in pre-payment income (the reduction in t).
3.  How much progressivity and income redistribution is fair?
Measuring the progressivity and redistributive effect of health care payments on
pre-payment income does not tell us whether or not they are equitable  per se. To answer
this question one needs to adopt positions with respect to both the definition of ATP and
the appropriate link between payments and ATP.
The WHO's 2000 WHR (World Health Organization 2000) does both. It argues
that ATP should be defined as the household's non-food spending, this being argued to
be a good indicator of a household's long-term "normal" living standards. One can think
of this approach as taking the household's pre-payment income, deducting its food
expenditure (as a proxy for non-discretionary expenditure), and then deducting (or
adding) any income windfalls (or shortfalls) compared to the household's "normal"
income. Denote ATP by y and any deductions allowed in moving from pre-payment
income to ATP by D(x). Thus we have:
(4)  y = x - D(x).
Using some results from the tax literature, we can explore this issue further and link the
concept of ATP to the concepts of progressivity and redistributive effect.
3.1.  Progressivity, redistributive effect and A TP: Some theoretical results
3.1.1. Progressivity  and ability  to pay
Following Pfahler (1990), the index of progressivity of health care payments on
pre-payment income,  .rT  can be decomposed into two parts: a part capturing the
progressivity of payments on ATP; and a part capturing the progressivity of deductions
on pre-payment income:
(5)  K =lK  _  K  K
Here  ;TR  measures the progressivity of payments on ATP, defined as
8(6)  7R  = 2 tLy ('p)  T-  u  (p)0p  = 2  L  pX-( LT  (p'PLp  CrT  CX-D'
so that nR  is positive-and  hence payments are progressive on ATP-if  the
concentration curve for ATP, y, lies above the concentration curve for payments, T. In
eqn (5), Sis the average deduction rate; i.e., deductions, D, expressed as a proportion of
pre-payment income, x. ,z  in eqn (5) measures the progressivity of deductions on pre-
payment income, and is defined as
(7)  Z;D  = 2f  [Lx(p)-LD(P)p  = CD  -GXX
which is positive if the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income lies above the
concentration curve for deductions.
From eqn (5), it is evident that the progressivity of payments on pre-payment
income reflects not just the progressivity of payments on ATP, but also the progressivity
of deductions on pre-payment income. Thus if deductions are a higher proportion of pre-
payment income for the better-off than the poor (i.e., if D is progressive or income-
elastic), z,  will be positive and deductions will exert a dampening effect on the
progressivity of payments on pre-payment income. By contrast, if deductions are a
smaller proportion of pre-payment income for the better-off than the poor (i.e., D is
regressive  or income-inelastic),  rD will be negative  and  deductions  will exert an
enhancing effect on the progressivity of payments on pre-payment income. Payments will
be more progressive on pre-payment income the higher is S(deductions as a proportion
of pre-payment income) and the more income-inelastic deductions are.
One of the implications of this is that if one's interest is in seeing whether
payments are appropriately linked to ATP, a progressivity analysis of payments on pre-
payment income will not help. WHO (World Health Organization 2000) argues that
payments for health care should be proportional to ATP. In other words ,;<  ought to be
zero, or equivalently there should the same degree of inequality in payments as there is in
ATP. In this sense, then, levying payments for health care in proportion to ATP is
egalitarian. From eqn (5), it is clear that estimates of the progressivity of payments on
pre-payment income cannot help us discern whether this condition is satisfied.
3.1.2.  Redistributive effect and ability to pay
Similar problems arise in the context of redistributive effect. Following Pfdhler
RS (1990), the RS index of health care payments,  ITT  can also be decomposed into two
9parts. The first part captures the redistributive effect deriving from the payment structure
(vis-a-vis ATP), while the second captures the redistributive effect brought about by the
deductions. We have:
Rs  (i  t)  RS  ___  RS
(8)  Tr  (I-t)  (-t)rD
RS where ZRS  measures the redistributive effect of payments attributable to the relationship
between payments and ATP. This is defined as:
(9)  ,Rs = 2  JLY-T (P)  - LX-D (P)PP  = CX_D -CY_T
so that  1Rs  is positive-and  hence the link between  payments  and ATP  has a pro-poor
redistributive effect-if  the concentration curve for ATP lies below the concentration
curve for income after health care payments and deductions, Y-T.  In other words, If  RS is
positive if there is more income inequality before payments (but after deductions) than
after payments (and after deductions). In eqn (8), zR  measures the redistributive effect
associated with the deductions, and is defined as
(1  0)  iRS  =  2  ,LX  D  (p) - LX  (p)p  GX-  CX_D
which is positive if the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income lies below the
concentration curve for ATP.
From eqn (8), it is evident that the redistributive effect of payments is an
increasing function of the redistributive effect deriving from the link between payments
and ATP (assuming 1-  94t>O),  and is a decreasing function of the redistributive effect
brought about by the deductions. The link with progressivity can be made clear by noting
that by analogy with eqn (3), we have:
(1  1)  ZRS  t  K
(12)  iR=D
which upon substitution into eqn (8) yields:
(13)  iRfs  t)  fK  t  (l  X  aK
10so that the redistributive effect of payments is an increasing function of the progressivity
of payments on ATP and a decreasing function of the progressivity of deductions on pre-
payment income.
If ATP and fairness are defined along the lines proposed by WHO, and a system
achieves these desiderata, payments for health care in that system will bring about an
amount of income redistribution equal to -[t&(l-t)(l-K)]  g  .This is positive-i.e.,  post-
payment income inequality will be less than pre-payment income inequality-if
deductions are income-inelastic. Thus pro-poor income redistribution in the move from
pre-payment to post-payment income is compatible with equity in the sense defined by
WHO. But, of course, such redistribution could be due also-at  least in part-to
progressivity of payments on ATP, which would violate WHO's definition of equity.
Simply knowing how redistributive health care payments are on pre-payment income
(i.e., the value of  zrS ) does not allow one to distinguish between these two scenarios.
3.2.  Fairness of out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam
In section 2.2, it was established that over the period 1993-98 in Vietnam out-of-
pocket payments became less regressive (indeed became mildly progressive) and the
redistributive effect became less pro-rich (indeed became mildly pro-poor). These
changes might be interpreted as equity-enhancing changes. But the Pfahler-type
decompositions using the WHO definitions of ATP and fairness tell a less optimistic
story (see column [a] of Table 2).
Over the period 1993 to 1998, food spending became less concentrated among the
better-off (CD  fell). Looked at in terms of deductions and ATP, this means that poorer
households had to shoulder a larger share of the burden of food expenses in 1998 than in
1993. Equity requires that this be borne in mind. Payments would need to have a less
disequalizing (or more equalizing) effect on income to compensate for the shift in the
distribution of food costs to the disadvantage of the poor. Thus the aforementioned
evidence that out-of-pocket payments had a smaller pro-rich redistributive effect in 1998
than in 1993 does not necessarily mean that equity in the payments distribution increased.
Some reduction in pro-rich redistributive effect would have been required simply to allow
the poor to stand still-relatively  speaking. To some degree, this imperative is reduced by
the smaller share of food costs in 1998-reflected  in the (slight) reduction of 5from
50.8% to 49.7%. Looking at 7  and  IR  , we see that out-of-pocket payments becamne
less regressive on ATP in 1998 compared to 1993, and that this reduced regressiveness of
out-of-pocket payments on ATP was associated with less income redistribution in 1998.
But the changes were smaller than the changes vis-a-vis the pre-payment distribution.
11Furthermore, as to be expected give the income-inelasticity of the food spending
distribution, out-of-pocket payments are more regressive and produce a larger
redistributive effect when assessed vis-a-vis the distribution of ATP than when assessed
vis-a-vis the distribution of pre-payment income.
The upshot is that from the point of view of out-of-pocket payments, equity--
defined a la WHO-improved  between 1993 and 1998 but not by as much as is suggested
by the progressivity and redistributive effect indices vis-a'-vis  pre-payment income. Tlhe
reason is that over the period 1993-98 food spending became less concentrated among the
better-off, so that although the distribution of pre-payment income became slightly more
equal, the distribution of ATP became more unequal.
3.3.  Some unresolved issues concerningfairness  and ATP
The attraction of defining ATP and stipulating a target relationship between
payments and ATP is that one ends up with a clear-cut answer to the question of whether
a distribution of health care payments is equitable or not. The usefulness of adopting this
approach is entirely contingent, however, on the acceptability of the value judgments
made-that  ATP can be defined as pre-payment income (or rather total household
consumption) less food spending; and that equity requires that payments be proportional
to ATP. Both are open to debate.
3.3.1.  Should food deductions be flat rate?
The first is, in effect, the issue of how deductions, D(x), ought to be defined to
move from pre-payment income to ATP. One obvious question is whether one ought to
deduct actual food spending or a food allowance indicating the cost of reaching a target
level of nutrient intake (say, 2100 calories a day). Some people, of course, are so poor
they have too little income to meet even such basic requirements. In Vietnam, in 1993,
for example, 23% of individuals had too little money to purchase enough food to reach
2100 calories a day. In such cases, it seems sensible to set ATP equal to zero, in just the
same way as someone whose pre-tax income is lower than the tax allowance is deemed
(in the absence of a negative income tax system) to have zero taxable income. I Deducting
an allowance for food costs will clearly alter the average of ATP and its distribution, as
well as the deduction rate d.
l Alternatively,  the full cost of reaching  2100  calories  could be deducted  leaving  such individuals  w'ith
a negative  ATP.  Proportionality  in this case  would  require  that health care payments  be negative,  which is
clearly  an unhelpful  benchrnark.
12Applying this idea to Vietnam in 1993 and 1998 produces the results indicated in
column [b] of Table 2. The costs of reaching 2100 calories a day have been calculated to
be 750 and 1287 thousand Dong respectively (current prices) (Glewwe, Gragnolati, and
Zaman 2000). Column [a] for each year shows the effect of defining D(x) as the per
capita food spending of the individual's household, while column [b] shows the effect of
deducting a food allowance corresponding to 2100 calories but constraining ATP to be
non-negative. Unsurprisingly, the second case produces a distribution of deductions that
is less pro-rich than the first case (cf. the values of CD).  The value of S(the average
deduction rate) falls in the move from full deductibility to the food allowance. The
element of progressivity of payments on pre-payment income attributable to the
deductions is higher for case [a] than case [b]. Unsurprisingly, because the progressivity
of payments on pre-payment income remains the same, the regressiveness of payments
on ATP rises. We conclude, therefore, that payments appear more regressive on ATP
when the latter is defined as pre-payment income less a flat-rate food allowance than
when it is defined as pre-payment income less actual food spending.
3.3.2.  Should deductions reflect only food costs?
With respect to deductions, there is, of course, the issue of whether D(x) should
reflect food costs only or whether it should reflect other costs that might be considered to
be non-discretionary. The costs of shelter (e.g. rent), clothes, heating and energy are
obvious examples. But what about the costs of, say, water, garbage disposal and
education? Again, there is the issue of whether one should deduct actual expenses
incurred or whether one should deduct an allowance. The latter approach is less
straightforward than in the case of food, where it is relatively easy to agree on a target
level of food intake (say, 2100 calories a day) and then compute the cost of reaching it.
The obvious alternative is to adopt the national or international poverty line as the
appropriate value for D(x). The difficulty with this is that it is intended to cover not just
the costs of food and other key non-food items such as shelter, energy, clothing, and so
on, but also the costs of health care. This is not a trivial issue in countries like Vietnam
where around 5-6% of household consumption is devoted to out-of-pocket payments for
health care. Clearly, one would need to adjust the national or international poverty line
downwards to reflect this when coming up with a figure for D(x).
We have done this exercise for Vietnam for 1993 and 1998, using the national
poverty lines computed by the World Bank and the Government of Vietnam (Glewwe,
Gragnolati, and Zaman 2000). These were constructed by computing the annual cost of
reaching 2100 calories per person per day (in current prices 750 and 1287 thousand Dong
in 1993 and 1998 respectively), and then adding to this amount a sum to cover non-food
13consumption. In the case of 1993, the amount added was the average non-food spending
of households in the third quintile (411 thousand Dong), this being the quintile whose
average food intake came closest to 2100 calories per person per day. In the case of 1998,
the figure of 41 1 thousand Dong was simply inflated by the value of the price index for
non-food items with 1993 as the base year (1.225), giving a non-food element to the
poverty line for 1998 of 1287 thousand Dong. We then took out from the non-food
elements of the 1993 and 1998 poverty lines amounts to cover the costs of health care. In
the case of 1993, people in the third quintile averaged 70 thousand Dong (current prices)
per person per year on out-of-pocket payments for health care. We then computed a
Laspeyres price index for the health sector for Vietnam for 1998, using data for 1993 and
1998 on contacts per person per year and out-of-pocket payments per contact, broken
down by provider type and by quintile of per capita consumption (World Bank et al.
2001). For all quintiles combined, this gave a figure for 1998 of 1.289.2  This compares to
a figure for all non-food items of 1.225 and a figure for the overall CPI of around 1.430.3
Applying this index value to the health spending component of the poverty line for 1993
gives a figure for 1998 of 90 thousand Dong (=70x1.289). The non-health poverty lines
for 1993 and 1998 were thus 1091 and 1700 respectively, which were then used as values
for D(x). As in the case of the deductions for food costs, individuals with a negative ATP
were assigned a zero ATP.
The results of this exercise are shown in column [c] of Table 2. Evidently,
deductions are less regressive on pre-payment when defined in terms of an allowance for
all goods and services (except medical care) than when defined in terms of simply an
allowance for food (  irK  is less negative). However, since 6is much larger when the more
generous deduction is used, the progressivity-enhancing effect of deductions is larger.
Out-of-pocket payments emerge as more regressive on ATP when deductions cover non-
food as well as food items, and more regressive than when deductions are set equal to
actual food spending. However, the pattern across the two years is the same whichever of
the three deductions is used-out-of-pocket  payments became more regressive on ATP
despite becoming less regressive (in fact becoming progressive having been regressive)
on pre-payment income.
2 One  rnight  argue  that  the index  value  for the 3rd quintile  ought  to be used  rather  than that  for the
sample  as a whole.  There  was,  however,  no discernible  trend  in  the Laspeyres  price  index across  quintiles.
The values  for the  bottom  through  top quintiles  were respectively:  1.085,  1.288,  1.147,  1.009  and 1.304.
3 The  lower  rate  of price inflation  in the health  sector  reflects  real  reductions  in the out-of-pocket
payments  per contact  for all provider  types except  public  hospitals,  but this  reflected  in turn  the large
reduction  in the real  price  of drugs and medicines-20-30%  between  1993  and 1998-more than  offsetting
the steep  rise  in fees among  all providers,  especially  public  providers
143.3.3.  Should payments be proportional to ATP?
In principle, then, requiring that payment be proportional to ATP has the
attraction of providing an answer to the question how progressive payments ought to be
on pre-payment income, or equivalently how much narrower or wider income inequalities
ought to be post-payment than pre-payment. In practice, however, as has been seen, there
is the problem that how one defines ATP-i.e.,  how one defines the "deductions" D(x)-
appears to have an important influence on one's conclusions concerning the fairness of
the distribution of health care payments and changes in equity.
Quite aside from this issue, there is the issue of whether policymakers everywhere
would endorse the value judgment that health care payments ought to be proportional to
ATP. Although the WHO claims that this value judgment seems to be the one that
receives majority support in an opinion survey from a convenience sample (Murray et al.
2001), it is obvious that one might argue that-in  much the same way as those with zero
ATP are defacto  exempt from contributing-ceilings  or maximum contributions could
be set at a certain level of ATP above which payments are not to required to rise any
further. Irrespective of the-inevitably  arbitrary-choice  of a target distribution of
payments as a finction of ATP, the framework presented in this section is helpful to
unravel the various factors that have an influence on the difference  between the actual
distribution and desired distribution.
4.  Vertical vs. horizontal inequity
So far in the paper the focus has been on vertical issues-how  people with
different prepayment incomes or different abilities ought to pay for their health care
relative to their income. In the case where payments are required to be proportional to
ATP, measurement proceeds by searching for departure from proportionality in the
vertical relationship between payments and ability to pay (as captured by  TK), or by
comparing inequality in income after deductions and before health care payments with
inequality in income after deductions and health care payments (as captured by ?r  S  ).  In
the case where the requirement of proportionality to ATP is not assumed, measurement
proceeds by searching for departure from proportionality in the vertical relationship
between payments and prepayment income (as captured by <K  ),  or by comparing
inequality in pre-payment income with inequality in post-payment income (as captured
by ;J,RS).  In each case, the focus is on vertical differences, and, in the case of the ATP
approach, on vertical equity.
15There is another aspect of equity, namely horizontal equity-the  issue of how far
people with similar abilities to pay end up spending similar amounts on health care. In the
context of health financing, and especially out-of-pocket payments, this is especially
important, since the randomness of ill health makes it highly likely that people with
similar incomes will end up paying very different amounts, with some paying nothing
and others paying very large amounts. Indeed, it seems likely that these horizontal
inequities-if  that is what they are-may  well dominate the vertical differences. This
contrasts with, say, the case of the personal income tax for which the techniques
developed above have been developed. There, it is differential treatment of people with
different incomes that is likely to be more important than unequal treatment of people
with similar incomes (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, van der Burg et al. 1999).
Horizontal inequity matters for two reasons. First, it may give rise to people
having different positions in the income distribution "before" and "after" health care
payments. If everyone at a given income paid the same, people's rank in the pre-payment
and post-payment distributions would be identical. If, on the other hand, people at a given
income pay different amounts, some reranking will occur. This "reranking" came out in
the Bank's  Voices of the Poor exercise in Vietnam. In Lao Cai-in  the mountainous
north of the country-one  26-year old man revealed how the hospital costs associated
with his daughter's severe illness had resulted in him moving from being one of the
richest in his community to being one of the poorest. Reranking matters in part because it
might be considered unfair in its own right, but also because it violates the assumption of
no reranking that underlies the framework above and the empirical results based upon it.
But there is a second reason for wanting to get to grips empirically with horizontal
inequity, which is that even if reranking is of no special ethical significance per se,
horizontal inequity most certainly is. Furthermore, the causes of horizontal inequity ard
the policy responses to it are different from those relating to vertical differences.
Muddling up vertical and horizontal inequities is unhelpful for both understanding the
causes of inequity and thinking about policies to reduce it. This section outlines a
framework that allows one to distinguish empirically between the two and also allows the
phenomenon of reranking to be incorporated and indeed quantified.
4.1.  Decomposing  redistributive  effect
In eqn (2) above, we assumed away the possibility of reranking. If reranking
occurs, redistributive effect needs to be measured as:
(14)  RE  = 2f  [L,-T(p)-LX(p)IP  = GX -GGX-T
16where  GX-T  is the Gini  coefficient for post-payment income and the p'  in parentheses
indicates the ranking in the post-payment  distribution. RE is positive if the Lorenz curve
for post-payment income lies above the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income, indicating
that payments reduce income inequality. RE will coincide with  ;RS  only if there is no
reranking in the move from the pre-payment to the post-payment income distribution. RE
has  been  shown  by  Aronson,  Johnson  and  Lambert (AJL)  (Aronson, Johnson,  and
Lambert 1994) to depend on four key factors and to be decomposable as follows:
(15)  RE=V-H-R,
where
IV  - ()TT 
H  laXGF(x)
and
R  Gx-T  - CX-T
In eqn (15), households are divided into groups of pre-payment equals, and
redistributive effect is partitioned into three components: a vertical component, V,
capturing the different payments made by the various groups of pre-payment equals; a
horizontal inequity component, H, capturing the different payments made by households
with similar pre-payment incomes; and a reranking component, R, capturing the
movements of households up and down the income distribution in the transition from the
pre-payment to post-payment income distributions. V  is measured by [t/(l - t)]7  , where
the Kakwani index of progressivity is computed using the average  payments made by
members of the household's pre-payment income group rather than each household's
actual payments. V thus indicates the amount of income redistribution attributable to the
fact that, on average, households at different points in the income distribution do or do
not pay different amounts for their health care. H is classical horizontal inequity.
Inequality in post-payment income is measured in each group of pre-payment equals via
a Gini coefficient, GF(X).  A weighted sum of these Gini coefficients is then computed,
with the ax as weights, defined as the product of the population share and post-payment
income share of households with pre-payment income X. The final term R is measured by
the difference between the Gini coefficient for X-T and the concentration index for X-T,
where in the latter case households are ranked by the pre-payment income.
In principle, reranking and horizontal inequity are distinct concepts. However, in
practice, they are hard to separate not least because the more likely reason for reranking
17is, in fact, the existence of horizontal inequality. This is shown in Figure 2 in the case
where payments are progressive on pre-payment income, X, and hence post-payment
income, X-T, increases in pre-payment income but at a decreasing rate. The average post-
payment income at any level of pre-payment income can be read off the function in
Figure 2. There will, however, be variations around this mean. These variations are
reflected in a "fan" emanating from the point on the post-payment income function
corresponding to the pre-payment income level in question, branching out to the post-
payment income axis. For example, a household with a pre-payment income of $1100
might pay $250 in health care payments, ending up in the post-payment distribution
behind the average household with a pre-payment income of $1000, which spends only
$1000. Thus reranking is caused by horizontal inequity. Given this, it seems unwise to :ry
to make too much of the distinction between R and H. This is reinforced by the fact that.
although in the population at large there will be households on the same pre-payment
income; in a household survey such instances are rare. In empirical work, it therefore
becomes necessary to define equals by reference to bands of pre-payment income, within
which, for the purpose of the exercise, households are deemed to be equal. The choice of
bandwidth inevitably affects the computed value of H, but also affects the computed
value of R. Specifically, it seems to be the case that as the bandwidth is narrowed, H falls
and R rises, though their does not seem to change much. In what follows we emphasize
the sum of H and R, rather than their individual values.
4.2.  The sources of redistributive effect of out-of-pocket payments in  Vietnam
RE can be computed simply as the difference between Gx and Gx-T.  To compute
<'  (or more precisely the concentration index for out-of-pocket payments, CT)  and CX-T
one has to decide on appropriate groups of pre-payment equals. In this illustration, pre-
payment equals were defined by expressing pre-payment income as a multiple of the
overall poverty lines for 1993 and 1998. Households below the poverty line z'  were
divided into eight groups, the first comprising households with a pre-payment income
between 0% and 12.5% of the poverty line, the second comprising households with a pre-
payment income between 12.5% and 25% of the poverty line, and so on. Households
with a pre-payrnent income of between 100% and 200% of the poverty line were divided
into just four groups, along similar lines, while those with pre-payment incomes in excess
of 200% of the poverty line were divided into just three groups. To put this into
perspective, nearly 60% of households fell below the poverty line in 1993, and nearly
40% did in 1998. With groups of prepayment equals defined, it is straightforward to
compute CT on the grouped data, and to form the ranking variable to compute CX  T.  Using
18the former and Gx, one can compute XT,  and using the latter and Gx-T  one can compute
R. This leaves H, which can be computed as a residual.
Table 3 shows the decomposition results of RE on pre-payment income for 1993
and 1998. In 1998, the redistributive effect of out-of-pockets was less than half of what it
was in 1993. Although all four components-i.e.,  t, ,rr,  H and R-were  reduced in
absolute value, it is clear from the percentage distributions that most of the reduction is
due to the reduced regressiveness of the out-of-pocket payments. Whereas in 1993, the
vertical component V accounted for about 47% of total RE, its share of RE in 1998 was
reduced to only 5.7%.
4.3.  The AJL decomposition and the A TP approach-results  for  Vietnam
The AJL decomposition can also be applied to the ATP approach. The approach
outlined in section 3 is useful if all deviation from proportionality of payments to ATP
arises from vertical inequity. In this case, G'R  and 7r'S will convey the information
required. But if there is horizontal inequity, ;RS will reflect this as well as vertical
inequity. By employing the AJL decomposition, one can quantify: (a) the extent to which
people with different abilities to pay end up paying similar proportions of their ATP
toward health care (V): (b) the extent to which people with similar abilities to pay end up
paying similar proportions of their ATP toward health care (H); and (c) the extent to
which people change positions in the income distribution of as a result of health care
payments (R).
We applied the AJL methodology to the ATP approach, using per capita pre-
payment income (i.e., consumption) less actual food spending as the measure of ATP.
Equals were defined by in the same way as with pre-payment income but now using
multiples of the poverty line exclusive of food payments (i.e., zy0,,) to generate the groups
of ATP "equals". Table 4 shows the results of this exercise for 1993 and 1998. As in the
case of pre-payment income, the total redistributive effect decreased between the two
years. In contrast to the previous table, however, the percentage contribution to RE of the
vertical component V  increases from 42% in 1993 to 63% in 1998, despite the reduction
in t from 12.6% to 10.7%. This is due to the increased regressiveness of out-of-pocket
payments on ability to pay, as shown by the decrease in  )rTK.
195.  Minimum standards and catastrophic health care costs
The egalitarian approach, through the measurement of redistributive effect,
captures the share of pre-payment income being spent on health care (captured by t in .qn
(3) or (15) for example), as well as how unequal this share is across the income
distribution (captured by  gT  in eqns (4) and (14)). But it does not respond to the concrn
that payments might be "too large". It is to this concern that the minimum standards
approach responds. Two sub-strands of literature can be identified, both of which are
built up around the notion that a focal variable ought not to exceed or fall short of a
threshold. One sub-strand sets the threshold in terms of proportionality of income. The
concern in this case is to ensure that households do not spend more than some pre-
specified fraction of their income on health care, and spending in excess of this threshold
is labeled "catastrophic". The second sub-strand sets the minimum in terms of the
absolute level of income. The concern here is to ensure that spending on health care dees
not push households into poverty-or  further into it if they are already there. We consider
each in turn, beginning in this section with catastrophic expenses.
The ethical position underlying this sub-strand of literature is that no one ought to
spend more than a given fraction (say zcat)  of their income on health care. A figure for Zcat
is inevitably arbitrary, and it would clearly depend on whether income was defined in
terms simply of pre-payment income, x, or in terms of some measure of ATP, y=x-D(x).
If the latter, clearly one ought to consider the various issues discussed above concerning
how D(x) is to be defined. If D(x) is to cover only food expenditures, should it cover
actual expenses or should it be a flat-rate allowance? If the latter, what should be done
with individuals whose pre-payment incomes fall short of the allowance? In this exercise,
these last two strategies are problematic, since y could become zero or negative. In the
case where y is zero, the ratio of health care spending to income is undefined, and
individuals with negative values ofy will end up with smaller (in numerical size) values
of Tly than those with small health spending and/or large incomes.
5.1.  Measuring  the incidence  and intensity  of catastrophic  health  care  costs
Suppose one has settled on whether x or y will be used, on the definition of D(x)
in the event the latter is to be used, and on an approach to circumvent the problems noted
above. Suppose too that a threshold Zcat has been agreed for Tlx  or Tly  above which
expenses are to be considered "catastrophic". The obvious summary measure of the
extent to which a given sample of individuals has been exposed to catastrophic expenses
(defined along these lines) would be the number (or fraction) of individuals whose health
care costs as a proportion of income exceeded the threshold. The horizontal axis in Figure
203 shows the cumulative share of the sample, ordered by the ratio Tlx,  beginning with
individuals with the largest ratio. Reading off this parade at the threshold zc,at one obtains
the fraction Hcat  of the sample whose expenditures as a proportion of their income exceed
the threshold Zcat. This is the catastrophic payment headcount. Thus let Oi be the
catastrophic 'overshoot', equal to Tl/Xi-zcat  (or TJ/yl-z, 0 ) if Tl/xi>zc,t  and zero otherwise,
and let Ei=l if Oi>O. Then the catastrophic  payment headcount is equal to:
(16)  Heat  =  IN  E. = PE'
where N is the sample size and pE is the mean of Ei.
The difficulty with this measure is that this fails to capture the height above which
individuals exceeding the threshold actually exceed it. This presumably matters. By
analogy with the poverty literature, one could define not just a catastrophic payment
headcount but also a measure analogous to the poverty gap, which we call the
catastrophic  payment gap (or excess). This captures the height by which payments (as a
proportion of income) exceed the threshold Zcat.  We divide this through by the sample
size to get the average excess Gca,.  Thus we measure the intensity or severity by defining
the average 'gap' (or excess) of catastrophic payments as
(17)  G  1at  =  N10i  = Po'
where dU0 is the mean of Oi. The mean positive  'gap' is:
(18)  MPGcat  = Z,,  E /  II  E; =  p  IO/E  '
We therefore have:
(19)  o =HEMPGcat
In other words, the overall mean catastrophic 'gap' equals the fraction with a positive gap
times the mean positive gap.
5.2.  Incidence and intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket  payments in Vietnam
We measured Oi by the ratio Tlx (i.e., out-of-pocket payments as a fraction of pre-
payment income), and set thresholds (i.e., Zcat)  at 2.5%, 5%, 10%, and 15%. Table 5 (a)
presents these results. We then re-did the exercise with Oi defined as the ratio T/y (i.e.,
out-of-pocket payments as a fraction of ATP), where y was defined as pre-payment
income less actual food spending. The ratio Tly thus gives the share of non-food
21consumption absorbed by out-of-pocket payments. In this second case, we used
thresholds of 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30% and 40% and the results are in Table 5 (b).
The tables show that in 1993, for instance, as much as 38% of the sample
recorded out-of-pocket payments in excess of 5% of their pre-payment income and that
34% of the sample spent more than 15% of their non-food consumption on out-of-pocket
expenditure. Inevitably, in both years, and for both income shares, both the proportion of-
the sample exceeding the threshold (Heat)  and the mean excess (Gcat)  fall as the threshold
(Zcat)  is raised. More interesting is the fact that for both income shares and for all the
thresholds in the range explored, both the proportion exceeding the threshold and the
mean excess were lower in 1998 than in 1993. This suggests that, in general, the
catastrophic character of out-of-pocket payments was reduced over the period in
question. In Table 5 (a), the mean positive gap MPGcat  has decreased (slightly) for the
first two thresholds, but increased (slightly) for the two highest thresholds. It is therefore
clear that most of the decline in the mean overall gap Gcat  is due to the decline in the
headcount Hea,  .In Table 5(b), the MPGCa,t  for ability to pay is always lower in 1998.
5.3.  Measures that reflect that catastrophic costs matter more for the poor
There is a difficulty with the approach outlined above, namely that it is blind as to
whether it is poor or better-off individuals who exceed the threshold. It seems likely most
societies will care more if it is an individual in the lowest decile whose spending (as a
share of its income) exceeds the threshold than if it is one in the top decile. One way of
shedding light on this is to see how the proportions of those exceeding the threshold vary
across the income distribution. This can be done formally using a concentration index for
Ei, which we define as CE.  A positive value of this will indicate a greater tendency for the
better-off to exceed the payment threshold, whilst a negative value will indicate a greater
tendency for the worse-off to exceed the threshold.
A difficulty is that the headcount, ,pE, and the concentration index, CE,  could
move in different directions over time. Or the former might be higher in country A than
country B, but the latter might be lower in country A than B. In such circumstances, it
would be useful to have an index trading off the two dimensions. We can do this by
constructing a weighted version of the headcount that takes into account whether it is
mostly poor people who exceed the threshold or better-off people. We do this by
weighting the variable indicating whether the person has exceeded the threshold, Ei, by
the individual's rank in the income distribution. Let ri denote person i's absolute rank.
This is equal to I for person 1, 2 for person 2, and N for person N. Then define
22(20)  wi =2  N
Thus wi is equal to 2 for the most disadvantaged  person, declines by 2/N for each one-
person step up through the income distribution, and reaches 2/N for the least
disadvantaged person. Thus the difference in w, between the most disadvantaged person
and the second most disadvantaged  person is the same as the difference between the
second most advantaged person and the most advantaged person. If we weight the Ei by
the wi, we get:
(2  1)  W5 at  N'E-
We have the following result (the proof of which is in the Appendix):
Result 1. Given the weighting used in (21), the index W.  can be written as:
(22)  WE,  = H_E  (1  CE  )
Thus we can modify the catastrophic payments headcount by weighting the dummy status
indicator, Ei, by the person's rank in the income distribution, giving larger weights to
poorer people. The weighting scheme chosen results in an attractive and simple summary
measure that is simply the catastrophic payment headcount multiplied by the complement
of the concentration index. If those who exceed the threshold tend to be poor, the
concentration index CE  will be negative, and this will raise WCE,,  above SUE.  Thus the
catastrophic payment problem is worse than it appears simply by looking at the fraction
of the population exceeding the threshold, since it overlooks the fact that it tends to be the
poor who exceed the threshold. By contrast, if it is better-off individuals who tend to
exceed the threshold, CE  will be positive, and lIE will overstate the problem of the
catastrophic payments as measured by  U't.
We can apply the same logic to the catastrophic payment excess. We define a
concentration index for the overshoot variable, Oi, which we denote by Co. Then we can
define an analogue of WcE,,  which can be shown to be equal to:
(21)  WG.,  = po  (1  CO  ).
A tendency for large excesses to be concentrated among poorer individuals results in a
negative value of CO,  which will raise WJGJ  above go-the  "excess payment problem" is
worse than it appears simply by looking at the mean catastrophic payment excess, since
23this overlooks the fact that the large catastrophic  payments are concentrated among the
worse off. By contrast, if it is the better-off individuals who have the largest excesses, Co
will be positive, and go will overstate the severity of the catastrophic payment problem as
measured by W
5.4.  The poor and catastrophic out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam
Table 5 (a) shows that at the lower thresholds, the incidence of "catastrophic"
health costs is more concentrated among the poor in both years, though more so in 1998
than in 1993. By contrast, at the higher thresholds the incidence of "catastrophic" health
costs is more concentrated among the rich in both years, and more so in 1998 than in
1993. The better-off are more likely to overshoot the threshold by a larger amount in both
years whatever the threshold, and for each threshold there is more concentration of
"overshooting" among the better-off in 1998 than in 1993. This coupled with the results
mentioned above indicates that whilst at low thresholds it is the poor who are more likely
to exceed them, they do not spend so far above the threshold as do the better-off. Since
the concentration indices are all positive, the index WG,,  is smaller than the mean
catastrophic excess,  pG,.  Catastrophic costs are thus less of a "problem" in both 1993
and 1998 than they would have been if the large "catastrophes" had been concentrated
among the poor.
The story is somewhat different in terms of ability to pay (or non-food
consumption). First, Table 5 (b) shows that the incidence of "catastrophe" is always more
concentrated among the poor, in both years, and for all thresholds. Another difference
with respect to the same exercise based on prepayment income is that the magnitude of
the "catastrophic overshoot" of ability to pay is more concentrated among the poor, but
much more so in 1993 than in 1998. Only at higher thresholds in 1998 does it become
more concentrated among the rich. Because most concentration indices are negative, the
rank-weighted indices tend to be higher than the headcount-based measures. In general,
both the x-based and the y-based approaches give very similar results in terms of the
rank-weighted welfare measures: when taking into account people's location in the
income ranking in either the incidence ( W  ) or intensity (WG,  ), the measures decrease
with rising thresholds but the index values are always higher in 1993 than in 1998. In
other words, the catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditure "problem" has unequivocally
lessened over the period in question.
246.  Minimum standards and impoverishment
There is still a difficulty with the "catastrophic" payment approach, namely that it
is blind as to how far "catastrophic" payments cause hardship. It seems likely most
societies will be more concerned about someone exceeding the threshold by, say, five
percentage points if their income is $0.75 a day than if it is $30 a day. An alternative
perspective is that of impoverishment, the core idea being that no one ought to be pushed
into poverty-or  further into poverty-because  of health care expenses. This position is
evident in the discussions in the World Bank's 2000/2001 WDR (World Bank 2000) and
in its Voices of the Poor consultative exercise (Narayan et al. 2000). In a sense, this
approach gets to the heart of the concerns over health care payments-that  health care
utilization is a response to an unforeseen and unsolicited "shock" and can be sufficiently
costly to represent a threat to a household's ability to purchase other goods and services
that may, like health care, make a difference to its members' ability to survive flourish as
a human beings.
6.1.  Measuring the impoverishing effects of health care costs
Figure 4 provides a simple framework for examining the impact of out-of-pocket
payments on the two basic measures of poverty-the  headcount and the poverty gap. It
also allows us to relate progressivity and redistributive effect to poverty impact. The
figure is a variant on Pen's parade. The two parades plot income (before and after out-of-
pocket payments) along the y-axis against the cumulative percentage of individuals
ranked by pre-payment income along the x-axis. Reading off each parade at the poverty
line gives the fraction of people living below poverty, while the area below the poverty
line above each parade gives the poverty gap. It is assumed in Figure 4 that the poverty
line is the same for post-payment income as for pre-payment income-this  is an issue we
return to in a moment.
Formally, the relevant concepts and measures can therefore be defined as follows.
Let zPe be the pre-payment poverty line (which may be different from the post-payment
poverty line for reasons discussed below) and xi be individual i's pre-payment income.
Then define Pi'e  =1  if x, < z".  Then the pre-payment poverty headcount is equal to:
(24)  HPP  v  pPre  - P°^N  i=,  i  -Appre2
25where N is the sample size. Denote by  gPre  the pre-payment poverty gap, which is equal
tox,-zpov  if x, <z,  and zero otherwise. The average  pre-payment  poverty  gap is
defined as:
(25)  GpovrN=  g; pe  re 
the normalized pre-payment  poverty  gap  as
G  pre
(26)  NGv  =pr
pov
and the mean positive pre-paynment poverty  gap  as
(27)  MPGp  =  g P/iV  ppre  pgp
We therefore have
(28)  itgpr  = u  V  PGo
In other words, the average (pre-payment) poverty gap equals the fraction with a positive
gap times the mean positive gap. Replacing the pre-payment poverty line z  'e by the post-
payment poverty line zp"',  and all other superscripts 'pre' by the superscript 'post'  gives
the analogous post-payment measures.
The measures of poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments are then simply
defined as the difference between the relevant pre-payment and post-payment measures,
i.e.,
(29)  p0  H  =Hf  p
(30)  plG  =GPot  - Gpr,  and
(31)  PIo=  Ao'  - IG  P  Pr.
6.2.  Impoverishment,  progressivity and redistributive effect-the  links
What deternines the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments? And what are the
links between poverty impact, on the one hand, and progressivity and redistributive
effect, on the other? In this sub-section we present some results for the case where the
poverty line remains the same before and after health care payments.
26Intuitively, one would expect that poverty impact would be linked to
progressivity. This is indeed the case. Figure 5 compares three post-payment income
distributions corresponding to three different payment structures, each with the same
value of t-one  proportional on pre-payment income, one progressive, and the other
regressive. In all three cases, and for all income levels, post-payment income is less than
the pre-payment income, and therefore poverty (however measured) is higher after out-
of-pocket payments than before. However, the three payment structures will, in general,
give rise to different poverty impacts. At a certain income level-the  break-even point-
the three structures give rise to the same post-payment income. Up to this income level,
post-payment income is highest under the progressive payment structure and lowest
under the regressive structure. Thus if the poverty line is below this break-even income
level, the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments is smallest under the progressive
payment structure and greatest under the regressive payment structure. Inevitably, beyond
the break-even income level, post-payment income is highest under the regressive
structure and lowest under the progressive structure. Thus if the poverty line is above the
break-even level, the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments is greatest under the
progressive structure and smallest under the regressive structure. In general, then,
providing the poverty line is not too high (i.e., not higher than the break-even income
level), the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments will be greatest if out-of-pocket
payments are regressive and smallest if they are progressive.
Like redistributive effect, poverty impact depends not just on progressivity but
also on the share of income absorbed by health care payments. Figure 6 shows the effect
of raising the value of t, holding the index of progressivity constant. The effect is to push
the post-payment Pen parade downwards by the same percentage of pre-payment income
at each income rank. Thus, like redistributive effect, the poverty impact is larger, for a
given value of Kakwani's progressivity index, the larger is t.
Given the various influences on poverty impact discussed above, it ought to be
clear that looking at progressivity alone might give a misleading picture of poverty
impact. Figure 7 shows two alternative health care payment structures-one  progressive,
the other regressive. In the progressive structure, health care payments absorb a fairly
high proportion of pre-payment income, while in the regressive structure, they absorb, on
average, only a very small fraction of pre-payment income. There is, as before, a break-
even income level, which-given  the differences in t and the progressivity index in this
example-occurs  at a relatively low income rank (a little over 30%). Below this break-
even level, pre-payment income is higher under the progressive structure-the  percentage
of income absorbed by health care payments on average is high but the structure is
progressive. Above the break-even level, pre-payment income is higher under the
27regressive structure-the  structure is regressive but the percentage of income absorbed by
payments is small on average. If the poverty line is below the break-even level, the
poverty impact is greater under the regressive payment structure, but if the poverty line is
above the break-even level, the poverty impact is greater under the  progressive  structure.
Thus, if a progressive structure absorbs a large proportion of pre-payment income, it may
well give rise to a larger poverty impact than a regressive structure absorbing a small
proportion of pre-payment income.
6.3.  How do out-of-pocket  payments add to poverty in Vietnam?
There are two obvious candidates for the poverty line that emerge from our earlier
discussion of the deductions D(x). The first is a food poverty line giving the cost of
reaching 2100 calories a day. This is often termed an extreme poverty line. Clearly, this is
applicable whether income is pre-payment or post-payment. In each case, one is asking
whether the person's pre- or post-payment income is sufficient for them to purchase
enough food to produce 2100 calories per day. Clearly, some individuals may cross such
a poverty line as the result of spending on health care, and some may sink further below
it. By comparing the headcounts and poverty gaps before and after health care spending,
one can get a sense of its impoverishing effects, whether in terms of additions to the
number of people classified as extremely poor or in terms of deepening poverty among
the extreme poor.
The second obvious poverty line is the amount used above in the more generous
deduction for food and non-food items. The difficulty here is that the poverty line for pre-
payment income ought to include an element for health spending, whilst the poverty line
for post-payment income ought not. As in computing the deduction D(x), one needs to
extract an amount from the poverty line corresponding to health spending to arrive at the
post-payment poverty line zP"'.  This means that whilst some people may not be poor
before health spending and be poor after it, there will be some who are marginally poor
before health spending but not poor after it (they spend nothing on health care or they
spend appreciably less than the health spending component of the pre-payment poverty
line). Thus, whereas in the case where the extreme poverty line is used poverty will
necessarily be higher "after" health spending than "before", in the case where the poverty
line covers food and non-food items, poverty may, in fact, be higher pre-payment than
post-payment.
In applying these methods to the data on out-of-pocket payments in Vietnam, we
employed a food (extreme) poverty line and a broader-based poverty line using the
amounts used in the deductions in the fairness analysis above. In the case of the food
28poverty line, the same amounts were used for the pre-payment and the post-payment
lines-750  and 1287 thousand Dong for 1993 and 1998 respectively. In the case of the
broader poverty line, a lower line was set for post-payment income, reflecting the fact
that health care payments have to be met from pre-payment income but have already been
met at the post-payment stage. The pre-payment and post-payment poverty lines for 1993
were set at 1160 and 1091 respectively, while the corresponding lines for 1998 were set
at 1790 and 1700 respectively.
Figure 8 shows the chart of Pen's parade for households (individuals are used in
the analysis that follows) for pre-payment income and extreme poverty in 1998. Overlaid
on the chart are the out-of-pocket payments of each household. In some cases,
households are clearly pushed further into extreme poverty by out-of-pocket payments,
whilst in others they are pushed below the extreme poverty line having started out
"before" out-of-pocket payments above it.
Table 6(a) shows that in the case of the food poverty line, out-of-pocket payments
increase the headcount ratio by 4.4 percentage points in 1993 and by 3.4 percentage
points in 1998. The poverty gap comparisons across years are most meaningful when
normalized poverty gaps are used (i.e., poverty gaps are divided through by the poverty
line). Out-of-pocket  payments increase the normalized gap by only 1.4 percentage points
in 1993 and by only 0.8 percentage points in 1998. In both years, around three quarters of
the addition to the poverty gap was from previously poor people being further
impoverished by out-of-pocket payments, and only one quarter was attributable to
previously non-poor people being pushed into extreme poverty as a result of out-of-
pocket payments.
From Table 6(b) it is clear that out-of-pocket payments have a smaller impact on
the headcount in the case of the broader-based poverty line. This reflects the lower
poverty line for post-payment income. Indeed, there is no assurance-as  indicated
above-that  the impact of out-of-pocket payments on the headcount will be positive in
this case. In the event, out-of-pocket payments increase the headcount ratio but by only
0.4 percentage points in 1993 and 0.5 percentage points in 1998. These low increases
reflect the fact that the percentages of the sample becoming poor through out-of-pocket
payments (1.9% in 1993 and 2.3% in 1998) are almost matched by the percentages of
persons who were among the pre-payment poor but not among the post-payment poor
(1.5% of the sample in 1993 and 1.7% in 1998). The need for the use of the normalized
poverty gap is, of course, even greater in this case than in the case of the food poverty
line, given that the poverty line is different pre-payment and post-payment, as well as
across years. In 1993, the normalized poverty gap is 0.4 percentage points higher post-
29payment, while in 1998 out-of-pocket payments increase the normnalized  gap by 0.2
percentage points.
6.4.  The impoverishing effects of hospital vs. other health costs in Vietnam
The impoverishment measurement methodology can be used to quantify the
different poverty impacts of hospital and other health spending. In the 1998 Vietnam
data, we separated hospital expenses (defined as costs associated with inpatient care over
the previous 12 months) and all other health care costs over the previous 12 months. On
average, the former account for around 20% of the total.
Table 7 shows the results of an analysis of the poverty impacts of these two
categories of expense, using the extreme food-based poverty line in order to explore
which of the two types is the main source of impoverishment. Looking at hospital costs,
the increase in the headcount (p1H ) is a mere 0.5 percentage points, while the value of
PI1  associated with non-hospital expenses is 2.9 percentage points. The values of the
impact on the mean poverty gap( plG  ) are 1.07 and 8.54 respectively. Clearly, and
perhaps in contrast to prior expectations, non-hospital expenditure has a larger poverty
impact in Vietnam than hospital expenditure. What is striking for hospital costs, however,
is that although most of the rise in the poverty gap is still due to poor people getting
poorer, this element is proportionally less than in the case of non-hospital expenses. In
other words, the share of the rise in the poverty gap accounted for by deepening poverty
among the pre-payment poor is smaller in the case of hospital costs than in the case of
non-hospital costs.
7.  Summary and conclusions
As noted in the Introduction, much has been written recently about equity or
fairness in payments for health care, "catastrophic" health care payments, and the
impoverishing effects of health care outlays. The aim of this paper is to clarify the
meaning of these termns,  to show how each might be measured, and to compare the
different measures. We illustrate each using household data on annual out-of-pocket
expenditures on health care taken from the 1992-93 and 1997-98 Vietnam Living
Standards Surveys (VLSS).
We distinguish between two strands in the literature-approaches  inspired by
egalitarian concepts of equity, and approaches focusing on "minimum standards".
Underlying the egalitarian approach is the view that payments should be linked directly
and continuously to ability to pay (ATP) rather than to usage of health services. The
30minimum standards approach has an element of this idea, but focuses on the extent to
which payments exceed a "catastrophe" threshold, or force households below a poverty
line or further below it if already there.
We label the first of the egalitarian approaches we consider the "agnostic"
approach, since the linkage of payments to ATP is simply measured by the degree of
progressivity of such payments on pre-payment income and by the degree of income
redistribution they generate. In Vietnam out-of-pocket payments were regressive on pre-
payment income and widened the income distribution (i.e., were associated with pro-rich
redistributive effect). By contrast, in 1998, out-of-pocket payments were mildly
progressive and associated with a small amount of pro-poor redistributive effect.
The "agnostic" approach does not tell us how equitable payments are-only  how
progressive they are on pre-payment income. The second egalitarian approach we
consider-proposed  recently by the World Health Organization and labeled in the paper
as the ATP approach-suggests  a target distribution for out-of-pocket payments and
hence allows one to quantify inequity. The equity "yardstick" proposed by WHO is that
payments should be proportional to ATP, and one aspect of inequity to be measured is the
extent to which payments deviate from proportionality with respect to ATP. This can
measured by examining the progressivity of payments on ATP (a zero value of the
progressivity index of payments on ATP, ;,  being the equity goal) or by examining the
redistributive effect of payments with respect to ATP (a zero value of the index of
redistributive effect of payments with respect to ATP,  7TRS  , being the equity goal). The
two conditions are equivalent, since proportionality with respect to ATP leaves the ATP
distribution intact. ATP can be thought of as pre-payment income less a deduction for
expenses deemed necessary to achieve a minimum subsistence level of consumption.
Setting up the analysis along these lines allows us to obtain some useful decomposition
results from the tax literature. These shed light on the relationship between the
progressivity and redistributive effect of payments on pre-payment income and on ATP.
For instance, eqn (13) in the paper shows that the degree of redistributive effect of
payments with respect to pre-payment income depends on the payments share, t, the
progressivity of payments on ATP, <lR,  the deductions share, A,  and the progressivity of
deductions on pre-payment income,  ZD.  If payments are proportional to ATP (IC'  = O  ),
dedutios  onprepayent  ncoe  ~D  Ifpyet  r  rprinlt  T  R~  )
there will still be some redistributive effect if the deductions are non-proportional to pre-
payment income. If, for example, deductions are income-inelastic (making up a higher
share of pre-payment income for the poor than the better-off), equity---defined in terms
of payments being proportional to ATP-will  result in some pro-poor income
redistribution.
31In the empirical illustration of the ATP approach, we show how by varying the
definition of deductions, the progressivity of payments on ATP and on pre-payment
income varies. We defined deductions first as actual food expenditure (a la WHO),
second as a flat rate poverty line deduction for food only, and third as a flat rate poverty
line deduction for all goods and services other than health care. The results showed that,
irrespective of the deduction definition used, equity-as  measured by (% changes in)
.
7
rR  improved between 1993 and 1998, but the improvement was greater in the case of
the flat rate food poverty line and overall poverty line deductions than in the case of
actual food expenditure.
We then consider a third approach within the egalitarian tradition that further
broadens the scope of the analysis by not focusing exclusively on vertical differences but
instead incorporating horizontal differences as well. The previous two approaches do not
adequately capture this as they implicitly assume that there is no reranking when going
from the pre-payment to the post-payment income distribution, and assuming that all of
the redistributive effect is due to progressivity. In practice, people do change ranking as a
result of payments and different people at the same pre-payment income end up paying
dramnatically  different amounts of their income toward health care. As the tax literature
shows, the total redistributive effect in such cases (RE'-L ) ought to be computed as the
difference between a vertical equity component (1) attributable to the degree to which, on
average, payments are progressive, and the sum of a horizontal equity component (IH)  and
a reranking component (R). This decomposition can be applied to the agnostic approach
or to the ATP approach. One implication for the latter is that payments could be
proportional to ATP on average (V=0),  and yet payments could produce redistributive
effect because H and R are non-zero (households at a given level of ATP pay different
amounts on health care). The ATP proportionality yardstick could thus be re-interpreted
to mean that V, H and R all be zero, or that RE (= V-H-R) is zero. The latter would allow
for the possibility that a positive V  due to payments being progressive on ATP is exactly
offset by the (pro-rich) redistribution induced by horizontal inequity (the negative value
of H+R is exactly equal to -V).
In the case of Vietnam, the total redistributive effect of out-of-pocket payments
with respect to both pre-payment income and ATP is negative in both years, but RE fell
(in absolute size) between 1993 and 1998. In the case of RE with respect to pre-payment
income, no equity interpretation can be given to the reduction of RE",  whereas in the
case of RE with respect to ATP, the reduction in RE'JL can be interpreted as moving
closer toward an equitable distribution which leaves ATP unchanged. The reasons for the
reduction (in absolute size) of RE is different in the two cases. In the first (RE with
32respect to pre-payment income), payments became less regressive in Vietnam over the
period 1993-98 and absorbed a smaller share of pre-payment income. V  thus
unambiguously fell in absolute size (i.e., became less negative). H and R also fell but by
much less. Most of the reduction in RE with respect to pre-payment income was thus due
to reduced vertical income redistribution. Indeed, in 1998 V  accounted for only 6% of the
total value of RE with respect to pre-payment income compared to 47% in 1993. In the
case of RE with respect to ATP, out-of-pocket payments became more regressive, but
because the share of ATP absorbed by them fell substantially, V  once again fell in
absolute size, but only by a small amount. By contrast, H and R fell quite considerably.
Most of the reduction in RE with respect to ATP was thus due to reduced horizontal
inequity (and consequent reranking) rather than to the reduction in the absolute size of V.
Indeed, the share of RE accounted for by vertical redistribution actually increased in this
case.
We then turn in the paper to minimum standards (or threshold) approaches. In the
first, the threshold is in terms of payments, and set as a proportion of pre-payment
income. In the second, the threshold is set in terms of post-payment income, in terms of a
poverty line. Payments resulting in people crossing the first threshold are classified as
"catastrophic" while payments resulting in people crossing the second are classified as
"impoverishing". For both approaches, we define indices which can be used to measure
both the incidence and intensity of the catastrophic or impoverishing impact. For the
catastrophic impact measure, we also show how it can be made sensitive to the location
of its occurrence in the income distribution-"catastrophic"  payments presumably matter
more for poor households than better-off ones.
In general, using the minimum standards "yardstick", things appear to have
improved in Vietnamn  over the period considered. Both the incidence and the intensity of
"catastrophic" payments fell, whether defined in terms of pre-payment income or ATP.
The incidence and intensity also became less concentrated among the poor. Furthermore,
the incidence and intensity of the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments were both
much lower in 1998 than in 1993. We also show how the methods can be used to see to
what extent the poverty impact is due to poor people getting poorer or previously non-
poor people falling into poverty, and which types of out-of-pocket expenditure can be
held responsible for most of the impact. We found that in the case of Vietnam most of the
poverty impact is due to the poor getting even poorer and to non-hospital care outlays
rather than payments for hospital care.
33Appendix
Proof  of Result  1.
Substituting (16) in (17), and expanding gives
WE,t  =  1N  Nlr,,  0  ]
(A1)  N  [N+1  N
2-  NE-2N  NRiE.  forlargeN.
N  E.  N  Yi=1
In eqn (Al), Ri is the person's relative rank (ranging from 0 to 1). Eqn (Al) can be
simplified. The first terrm  is equal to 2,ub1. The second can be simplified using the
following expression for the concentration index given in Kakwani et al. (Kakwani,
Wagstaff and Van Doorlsaer 1997):
(A2)  CE,=2  R.E -I
N,uca
so that the second term in (Al) is equal to (CE +1)  uEf.  Substituting these expressions
for the first and second terms of eqn (Al)  gives eqn (18) in the text.
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36Table 1: Progressivity and redistributive effect of out-of-pocket payments with
respect to prepayment income in Vietnam, 1993-98
1993  1998  % change
x  1,386  2,771  99.9%
T  82  149  80.6%
t= T/x  5.7%  5.4%  -5.8%
GX  0.3566  0.3517  -1.4%
CT  0.3028  0.3570  17.9%
TK  -0.0537  0.0053  -109.8%
CXT  0.3598  0.3514  -2.3%
7.  R=t/(l_t)  T  -0.0032  0.0003  -109.2%
Table 2: Progressivity and redisti-ibutive  effect of out-of-pocket payments with
respect to ability to pay in Vietnam 1993-98
Deductions
[a]  [b]  [c]
Actualfood  exp  Food poverty line  Total poverty line
1993  1998  1993  1998  1993  1998
O  50.8%  49.7%  49.3%  45.0%  64.2%  56.3%
'TRK  -0.1630  -0.1149  -0.3554  -0.2581  -0.4799  -0.3568
CY-T  0.4872  0.4856  0.7032  0.6430  0.8736  0.7638
7c  RS  -0.0214  -0.0137  -0.0450  -0.0279  -0.0908  -0.0500
CD  0.2509  0.2300  0.0461  0.0297  0.1188  0.0710
'CD  -0.1057  -0.1218  -0.3104  -0.3221  -0.2377  -0.2807
CX-D  CY  0.4659  0.4719  0.6582  0.6151  0.7828  0.7138
-gD  RS-0.1093  -0.1202  -0.3017  -0.2634  -0.4262  -0.3621
37Table 3: Decomposition of redistributive effect on prepayment income (x) into
vertical, horizontal and reranking components, Vietnam 1993-98
1993  1998
x  1,386  2,771
T  82  149
t  5.9%  5.4%
GX  0.3336  0.3517
GX-T  0.3393  0.3542
CX-T  0.3377  0.3528
RE = Gx- GX-T  -0.0057  -0.0024
<(on  grouped data)  -0.0421  -0.0025
CT  (on grouped data)  0.2915  0.3493
V=[t/(1-t)]  T  -0.0027  -0.0001
H  0.0014  0.0010
R=  GXT-CXT  0.0016  0.0013
H+R  0.0030  0.0023
V  %  46.8%  5.7%
H %  -24.9%  -39.4%
R %  -28.3%  -54.9%
H+R %  -53.2%  -94.3%
38Table 4: Decomposition of redistributive effect on ability to pay (y) into vertical,
horizontal and reranking components, Vietnam 1993-98
1993  1998
y  652  1,394
T  82  149
t= T/y  12.6%  10.7%
ZYv  426  503
GY  0.4509  0.4871
GY-T  0.4786  0.5046
CY-T  0.4713  0.4988
REy =  GY- GY-T  -0.0277  -0.0174
)r (on grouped data)  -0.0800  -0.0915
CT (on grouped  data)  0.3709  0.3957
V=[/(l-t)  UT  -0.0116  -0.0109
H  0.0088  0.0033
R= GY-T-CY-T  0.0073  0.0032
H+R  0.0162  0.0065
V%  41.7%  62.7%
H%  -31.8%  -4.0%
R %  -26.4%  -33.3%
H+R  %  -58.3%  -37.3%
39Table 5: Incidence (headcount) and intensity (or gap) of catastrophic out-of-pocket pavments in Vietnam. 1993-98
Table  5(a):  Share of prepayment  income (T/x)  ___  __  _  _
1993  1998
Threshold level z,,t  2.5%  5%  10%  _  1500  2.5/o  5%  10%  15%/
Headcount  measures
Hcat  60.97%  38.19%  18.40%  9.26%  55.47%  33.02%  14.20%  7.73%
CE  -0.0161  -0.0113  0.0125  0.0068  -0.0391  -0.0290  0.0279  0.1123
Wlat  61.95%  38.62%  18.17%  9.20%  57.63%  33.98%  13.80%  6.86%
Gap measures
Gcal  4.06%  2.85%  1.51%  0.84%  3.41%  2.34%  1.24%  0.71%
MPGcat  6.66%  7.47%  8.21%  9.06%  6.14%  7.09%  8.76%  9.20%
Co  0.0057  0.0151  0.0298  0.0408  0.0513  0.0932  0.1829  0.2794
4.04%  2.81%  1.47%  0.80%  3.23%  2.12%  1.02%  0.51%
Table 5(b): Share of ability to pay (T/y)
1993  1998
Threshold  level Z,,t  10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  40%  10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  40%o
Headcount  measures
HI.t  46.89%  33.39%  24.35%°  17.89%  13.19%  6.92%  41.52%  28.33%  19.26%  13.95%  10.34%  5.13%
CF  -0.0991  -0.1097  -0.1214  -0.1324  -0.1252  -0.1219  -0.1373  -0.1350  -0.1267  -0.1076  -0.0836  -0.0076
51.54%  37.05%  27.30%  20.25%  14.84%  7.77%  47.22%  32.15%  21.70%  15.45%  11.20%  5.17%
Gap measures
G,at  7.12%  5.13%  3.70%  2.66%  1.90%  0.92%  5.66%  3.93%  2.76%  1.94%  1.33%  0.61%
MPGcat  15.17%  15.36%  15.20%  14.85%  14.38%  13.30%  13.64%  13.88%  14.32%  13.90%  12.91%  11.88%
Co  -0.1168  -0.1210  -0.1236  -0.1208  -0.1180  -0.1202  -0.0936  -0.0731  -0.0505  -0.0210  0.0126  0.0867
Wea,  7.95%  5.75%  4.16%  2.98%  2.12%  1.03%  6.19%  4.22%  2.90%  1.98%  1.32%  0.56%




z  pre  750  1287
pov
zpost  750  1287 zpov
Poverty headcounts
H pre  23.4%  15.0%
pOV
H  pPo°st  27.7%  18.4%
pH  = H Pos
t _Hpre  44%  34%
pov  pov44%34
Poverty gaps
povPrve  38.05  40.56
Gpoost  48.18  50.24
pj  G = GPosl _G  pre  10.13  9.68
pov  - -pov
Normalized poverty gaps
Gov  5.1%  3.2%
NG post  6.4%  3.9%
piNG  =NGP0 s'-  NGPO,  1.4%  0.8%
Prepay PG prepay poor (A)  907078  3074346783
PG increase prepay poor (B)  182475  540819857
PG increase prepay nonpoor (C)  58965  193279823
A as % of (A+B+C)  79%  81%
B as % of (A+B+C)  16%  14%
C as % of (A+B+C)  5%  5%
B as % of (B+C)  76%  74%
C as % of (B+C)  24%  26%




z  prO  1160  1790
zpos'  1091  1700
Poverty headcounts
HPre  54.0%  37.4%
H  Post  54.4%  37.9%
Pl  = HPosH  -H  pre  0.4%  0.5%
Poverty gaps
G  PpOrve  199  171
Gpo°s  192  166
pIG  = GP t- GPre  -7.79  -5.05
Normalized poverty gaps
NGPre  17.2%  9.5%
NGPpoovst  17.6%  9.7%
pJNG  o  =  -pr  0.4%  0.2%
# entering  454  1721643
#  leaving  365  1311036
#  staying  12517  27019071
Total # pool of poor (N)  23839  75806642
% entering pool of poor  1.9%  2.3%
% leaving pool of poor  1.5%  1.7%
% staying in pool of poor  52.5%  35.6%
Total pool of poor (%)  100.0%  100.0%
42Table 7: Poverty impact of total, hospital and other out-of-pocket expenditure,
Vietnam 1998
Total  Hospital  Other
Food poverty lines
zpre  1287  1287  1287
Zpost  1287  1287  1287
Poverty headcounts
HpoPre  15.0%  15.0%  15.0%
Hpovs t 18.4%  15.4%  17.8%
PjH  = HPos-HpoSI  - 3.4%  0.5%  2.9%
Poverty gaps
GPrve  40.56  40.56  40.56
GPovs'  50.24  41.63  49.09
pIG  = GPost  -GPre  9.68  1.07  8.54 pov  o
Normalized poverty gaps
NG  pre  3.2%  3.2%  3.2%
NGPovst  3.9%  3.2%  3.8%
PI NG  = NGPst -NGpre  0.8%  0.1%  0.7%
Prepay PG prepay poor (A)  3074346783  3074346783  3074346783
PG increase prepay poor (B)  540819857  54727806  508083771
PG increase prepay nonpoor (C) 193279823  26725566  139066114
A as % of (A+B+C)  81%  97%  83%
B as % of (A+B+C)  14%  2%  14%
C as % of (A+B+C)  5%  1%  4%
B as % of (B+C)  74%  67%  79%
C as % of (B+C)  26%  33%  21%
43Figure  1: Lorenz  curve of pre-payment  income and conccntration  curves of
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44Figure 3: Catastrophic  out-of-pocket  expenditures  as share of pre-payment  income,
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45Figure  5: Poverty impact  and the break-even  level of income at which
post-payment  income is independent  on degree of progressivity
- pre-payment  income
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Figure 6: Poverty impact and the share  of (progressive)  payments
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46Figure 7: Poverty impact, progressivity and level of payments
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